Why do capital intensive companies pay higher wages? by Virén , Matti
Matti Virén
Why do capital intensive 
companies pay higher wages?
 
Bank of Finland Research
Discussion Papers

























































Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 
5 • 2005 
   Matti Virén 
   Why do capital intensive 
companies pay higher wages? 
    The views expressed are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. 
 
Department of Economics, FIN-20014 University of Turku, 
Finland and Bank of Finland, P.O. Box 160, FIN-00101 
Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: matti.viren@bof.fi. Prepared for 
presentation at the AEA Conference on the Econometrics of 
Labour Demand, Mons, Belgium, October, 2004. I am grateful 
to Mikko Puhakka and Jouko Vilmunen for helpful comments, 
Helinä Lakkonen for research assistance and the Yrjö Jahnsson 

























































Helsinki 2005  
3 
Why do capital intensive companies pay higher 
wages? 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 5/2005 
Matti Virén 




An obvious answer to this question is the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis 
originally proposed by Zwi Griliches (1969). But the relatively poor performance 
of this hypothesis suggests that other explanations are needed. Here we consider 
the labour union behaviour in the wage bargaining process as such an alternative. 
The explanation is based on the observation that capital intensive companies are 
more vulnerable to strike threats and may thus more easily give in for union wage 
demand. Thus, the bargaining power of unions is related to the capital-labour 
ratio. This paper provides some tests for these hypotheses with panel data for 
Finnish companies. The results give support to the wage bargaining hypothesis. 
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Miksi pääomaintensiiviset yritykset maksavat 
suurempia palkkoja? 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 5/2005 
Matti Virén 




Tässä tutkimuksessa etsitään selitystä kysymykseen, miksi pääomaintensiivisissä 
yrityksessä maksetaan parempia palkkoja kuin muissa yrityksissä. Ilmeinen 
vastaus on pääoman ja tietotaidon välinen komplementaarisuus Zwi Grilichesin 
(1969) esittämän hypoteesin mukaisesti. Tämän hypoteesin suhteellisen heikko 
selityskyky viittaa kuitenkin siihen, että tarvitaan muitakin selityksiä. Tässä 
tutkimuksessa esitellään vaihtoehtoisena selityksenä ammattiliittojen käyttäytymi-
nen palkkaneuvotteluissa. Selitys perustuu siihen havaintoon, että pääoma-
intensiiviset yritykset ovat muita yrityksiä alttiimpia lakonuhkalle ja suostuvat 
siksi helpommin liittojen palkkavaatimuksiin. Siten ammattiliittojen neuvottelu-
voima riippuu pääoman ja työvoiman välisestä suhteesta. Tutkimuksen empiiri-
sessä osassa raportoidaan tämän hypoteesin testituloksia, jotka perustuvat suoma-
laisia yrityksiä koskevaan paneeliaineistoon. Tulokset ovat sopusoinnussa yllä 
mainituin neuvotteluvoimahypoteesin kanssa. 
 
Avainsanat: palkat, palkkaneuvottelut, palkkajakaumat, paneeliaineistot 
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Why are similar workers paid differently, is a question which cannot be easily 
answered. We know that there is a lot of wage dispersion and that standard wage 
equations can explain only small fraction of the variation. Take for instance the 
human capital variables: although they clearly significant they can explain only 
little of the variance of cross-section wages. It is often argued that 70 per cent of 
the (log) wage variation is not explained by observed ability differences. 
Obviously this means that some form of imperfect competition is necessary to 
explain the empirical findings.
1 As for the characteristics of the wage dispersion 
there are some regularities in between wages across firms. We know for instance 
that large companies pay higher wages than small companies. But we do not 
exactly know why this is the case; do the differences for instance just reflect 
unobservable worker ability or job attributed differences. Another feature of wage 
differences is the positive association of wages and capital intensity which at least 
in the Finnish data shows up quite clearly as the following graph (Figure 1) 
illustrates.
2 
  Now if we take the positive correlation as an established fact, we should of 
course provide an explanation for it.
3 An obvious starting point is the capital-skill 
complementarity hypothesis originally proposed by Zwi Griliches (1969). 
According to this hypothesis capital intensive production requires more human 
capital (skill) and assuming that a proper rent is paid to human capital we would 
expect capital intensive firms to use disproportionally more skilled labour and 
thus there would a positive correlation between capital intensity and wages. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This point is forcefully advanced by Mortesen (2003). Mortensen’s explanation for wage 
differences is based a search-theoretic model which allows all firms to have some sort of 
monopsony power. In this set-up the search friction and cross-firm differences in labour 
productivity are key ingredients in the creation of wage differentials. 
2 The regression line in the figures is computed using a robust regression. 
3 Obviously, the explanation can be related to a hypothesis where causality runs from higher wages 
to higher capital intensity or from higher capital intensity to higher wages. In the fist alternative, 
which might well be true, we have the problem that we have no obvious explanation for the high 
wages. Similarly, in the second alternative, capital intensity is just a given fact but that might not 
be so bad assumption because to some extent technological differences can be taken as exogenous. 
The positive association between wages and capital intensity has been established also in Juselius 
(2004) using aggregate Finnish time-series data.  
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Figure 1.  Wages and the capital/labour ratio for in the 
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The hypothesis has been subject for quite intensive empirical research but while 
the empirical evidence has generally given some support to the hypothesis (see eg 
Krusell et al 2000
4) it has been somewhat moot (see eg Duffy, Papageorgiou and 
Perez-Sebastian (2003)). Partly this reflects the fact that testing requires quite 
sophisticated data and such data are usually available only in aggregated from 
(like in country averages). 
  In this light it may be well-founded to look for competing explanations. Given 
the case of Finland where trade unions seem play an important role in wage 
determination process and where average unionization is above 80 per cent it is 
not difficult to argue that some specific features of wage bargaining may affect 
                                                 
4 In the Krusell et al (2000) analysis the idea is that the decrease in the relative price of investment 
goods has increased investment and – because of the skill-capital complemetarity – and demand 
for skilled labour. That, in turn, has pushed up the skill premium in wages.  
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the wage structure. In particular, one could argue that unions make use of the 
capital intensive companies’ ‘bad’ outside options. That is, if there is a strike the 
company will end up with negative profits due to fixed costs. The higher are the 
fixed costs, the more vulnerable are the companies and the more easily they give 
in to unions’ wage demands. 
  Although union bargaining model provides an obvious explanation for the 
positive relationship between wages and capital intensity it is not the only 
explanation. One alternative is the efficiency wage hypothesis which is 
particularly relevant in the case of non-unionized industries. According this 
hypothesis wages also increase productivity which obviously creates a positive 
relationship between wages and productivity. The role of capital comes evident if 
one takes into account the fact that better effort also allows for more efficient use 
of capital. In the same way, one may think that ‘the capacity utilization rate’ is 
determined by the (relative) wage rate. High wages facilitate the more efficient 
production, ie higher return to capital which in turn translates to higher capital 
intensity.
5 
  After going through all this, it is perhaps fair to state that also the search 
theoretic approach (Mortensen 2003) can as well rationalize the positive 
association between wages and capital intensity (productivity).
6 
  From the point of empirical testing that is, of course, bad news because our 
ability to discriminate between different theories is quite limited. Had we 
individual (worker) data with also detailed data of the employer characteristics in 
the way of eg Abowd et al (1999), discriminating different hypothesis might be 
possible. But anyway it might be useful to be able to establish the exact role of 
capital intensity in wage determination. 
  That is why we formulate a wage equation in which we have the capital 
intensity as the main forcing variable. We have also several proxies reflecting 
union militancy to control the bargaining power parameter. In order to control the 
productivity effect we also introduce the labour quality (schooling) variable. The 
performance of this variable may also shed light on the role of the capital-skill 
complementarity hypothesis. 
  In what follows next, is the derivation of he wage equation, then an empirical 
analysis with panel data of Finnish companies and, finally, some concluding 
remarks. 
                                                 
5 See eg Lerner (1999) who analyzes the determination wages, effort and capital intensity in a 
simple two sector model. He also presents some evidence on  wage/capital intensity association. 
See also Konings and Walsh (1994) who try compare the different wage determination models 
with the UK data. 
6 In a addition to Mortensen (2003) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) one ought to mention 
Pissarides (2000) in which wages are determined as the outcome of bilateral bargaining between 
the employee and the employer (in a world where there is incomplete information of wages in 
different firms).  
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2 Wage  bargaining 
Assume efficient bargaining with the following basic assumptions: Workers have 
utility U in terms of the wage w and the alternative income b (which is finances 
by lump-sum taxes from workers) while firms have the conventional profit 
representation in terms of revenues and costs. Assume that (in the short run) 
capital is fixed and its value is taken as given in the bargaining process.
7 
  Thus, we have the following Nash product which ought to be maximized with 




1–β = [(w – b)L]
β[pAF(L,K) – wL – cK + cK]
1–β (2.1) 
 
where A is the productivity factor, L employment and cK the fixed (capital) cost 
(notice that the outside option for the firm is -cK). β indicates the bargaining 
power of the union. 
  Given the utility fuction, employment is determined according to the first 
order condition pAfL  =  b which implies a constant employment level L* 
(independently of the bargaining power of the parties) equal to  ) Ap / b ( f
1
L
− . See eg 
Muthoo (1999) for details. That in turn implies the following solution to the wage 
rate 
 
w = (1 – β)b + β{pAF(L,K)/L} (2.2) 
 
The solution implies that the wage is a convex combination of the alternative 
income and average gross return (see eg MacDonald and Solow (1981) for 
details). In other words, we could write the result as w = (1 – β)b + β{pf(L)/L} –
 cK} + βcK/L where the second term on the RHS is the conventional average 
return (net of capital costs) while the third term the (fixed) capital costs. Because 
in the short run the capital costs are sunk costs they simply cancel out. Thus, if 
β  =  1 (unions completely dominate the wage setting process) wages would 
exhaust all income, also capital income. Obviously, this could not be a feasible 
long-run solution because the company would simply go to bankrupt. 
  This bankruptcy risk suggests that the bargaining power of unions is 
positively related firms’ capital intensity. One way to put it is to say that the 
                                                 
7 Quite different situation emerges in a dynamic set-up where the outcome of bargaining affects 
investment and growth, see eg Devereux and Lockwood (1991). In the dynamic set-up the relative 
bargaining situation of a firm and the union may turn completely upside down: the firm has a 
positive outside option in financial markets while the union has just a zero option. See eg 
Bertocchi (2002). In the dynamic set up, we obviously face the problem of time-consistence and 
credibility due to the fact that the union’s bargaining position is quite different before after 
investment. See eg Van der Ploeg (1987) for details.  
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longer is the strike, the bigger is the bankruptcy risk. These considerations may be 
formalized by ‘endogenisizing’ the bargaining power parameter β in such a way 
that β = β(k). One simple way of doing this, is to assume the following functional 
form for β = 1 – exp(-γk). If we plugged that into (2.2) it would give us 
 
w = b{exp(-γk)} + AR(1 – exp(-γk)) (2.3) 
 
where AR = pAf(k), f(k)L being equal to F(K,L). The partial derivative of wages 
w.r.t. the capital/labour ratio would now be 
 
∂w/∂k = -γb{exp(-γk)} + γAR{exp(-γk)} + (1 – exp(-γk))MR > 0. 
 
where MR = pAf’(k). Clearly, the behaviour of ∂w/∂k as k → 0 or k → ∞ depends 
on the limiting properties of the AR- and MR-functions. 
  One might extend this line of argument by suggesting that heavily indebted 
firms are even more handicapped in this bargaining situation and thus β may not 
only depend on k but on the whole asset liabilities structure of the firm. Although 
we also test this hypothesis we have to admit that here our approach is quite 
speculative because bankruptcy threat is quite delicate for both the union and the 
firm and in reality the bankruptcy risk may prevent most extreme wage demands 
from the side of the union. 
  The fact that capital intensity will increase wages does not only apply to the 
efficient bargaining model which we use here as a point of reference. If we use the 
so-called ‘right to manage model’ (which is quite popular in Europe) we can end 
up with the following solution 
 
w = {(εD + θ)/(εD + ρ – 1)}b  (2.4) 
 
where εD is the labour demand elasticity and ρ = (1 – β)αL/β(1 – αL) where αL is 
the labour share of income. In the case of CD production function, this simplifies 
to 
 
w = {(1 – β) + β/α}b (2.4’) 
 
where α is the factor share of labour which also shows up in the labour demand 
elasticity –(1  –  α). Clearly, if α = 1,  w = b  and  if  α  =  0, wages go to infinity. 
Setting β equal to 1, we obtain the monopoly union model solution which here 
implies that w  =  (1/α)b. In this model capital intensity shows via the labour 
demand elasticity: if the labour costs represent just a small piece of total costs, 
labour demand elasticity is correspondingly higher and that offers an advantage to 
the union.  
12 
  The matter would be different if we assumed that the fall-back position of the 
firm would indeed be larger than -cK (eg because of liquidity and customer 
relationship problems). If we assumed that the true fall-back position were   
-(1 + θ)cK we would end up with the following version of (2.2) 
 
w = (1 – β)b + β{pAf(k)} + βθck (2.2’) 
 
Accordingly, in the ‘right-to manage model cum the CD production function with 
αK = ck/pAf(k) = 1 – α, the wage equation takes the following form
8 
 
w = [{β(1 + θ) + (1 – β)α)}/{α(1 + βθ)]b (2.4’’) 
 
Clearly, w increases along with θ. If θ→∞ or β→1 (2.4’’) again approaches 
w = (1/α)b. In other words, firms’ vulnerability allows unions bargain higher 
wages. 
  Before estimating the model it is worth considering alternative models which 
may produce a similar wage – capital intensity relationship. As pointed out in 
section 1, one potentially relevant alternative is the efficiency wage model. In a 
simple one factor (labour) model, the positive association between w and K/L 
does not, of course, hold because the wages are determined by the Solow 
condition in which the elasticity of effort with respect to wages is 1. In a more 
complex world this result does not necessary hold, however. 
  Introducing capital does not change the basic result unless we also change the 
form of the production function. In the general set of capital and labour it is 
tempting to write the production function in such a way that the ‘effort’ effect 
applies not only employment but the whole production. One way of interpreting 
this effect is to consider ‘effort’ as some sort of capital utilization effect. Having 
‘better’ worker “qality” facilitates non-disturbed and efficient production. This 
would simply mean that the production function would take the following form 
 
Q = uAF(K,L) = uAf(k)L 
 
In this case, the Solow condition does not simply hold but wages depend on 
capital intensity. Take for instance a simple employer – employee relationship 
with the profit maximization condition 
 
pAu(w)f(k) – w – ck  (2.5) 
 
                                                 
8 Notice that in the ‘Right-to-manage’ model marginal product = wage equality still holds opposite 
the Efficient bargaining model (see Bentolila & Saint-Paul (2003) for details).  
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where u(.) can be interpreted as the capacity utilization rate. One might think that 
it varies between 0 and 1 with for instance the following mapping to the wage 
rate: u = (1 – exp(-φw)). Now, if k is given, it is almost trivial to show that k has a 
positive effect on w (w  =  u’
-1(1/pAf(k))). If k and w are jointly determined, 
demand (p) productivity (A) and cost (c) shocks will move k and w to the same 
direction generating a positive association between these variables (see Appendix 
1 for details). 
  The problem is, that this kind effect cannot really be distinguished from the 
union power and wage bargaining effect. If we had data on turnover and some 
other characteristics of firms’ employment we might be able to do that but right 
now we have to leave that kind of analysis to future research (see Gera and 
Grenier 1994 for an attempt of distinguishing these and other wage effects). 
 
 
3 Empirical  analysis 
Now, turn to empirical testing of the hypothesis that higher capital intensity leads 
to higher wages in a wage bargaining model. Technically, the simplest way is to 
estimate the nonlinear specification (2.3) directly. Put simply, the model says that 
capital intensity will increase the share of total return which goes to labour. In 
other words, at the firm level the relationship between wages and productivity 
becomes stronger along with capital intensity. 
 
wt = a1{exp(-a2kt)} + q(1-exp(-a2kt)) + a3wt-1 + µt, (3.1) 
 
where w is the real wage, q the output labour ratio (labour productivity) and µ the 
error term. The lagged dependent variable is introduced to take into account the 
fact that wage agreements cover more than one period and that firm-specific 
features in wages and productivity may prevail longer time. 
  Alternatively, we could just use a linearized form of equation (2.2) or, in fact 
(2.2’) and test whether capital intensity as an additional independent explanatory 
variable has a positive effect on wages given labour productivity and other control 
variables of w. Then the estimating equation would simply take the following 
linear form: 
 
wt = b0 + b1wt-1 + b2bt + b3qt + b4Et + b5kt + b6s + µt (3.2) 
 
where b denotes the alternative income, E the educational (human capital) level of 
employees, k the capital-labour ratio, K/L, and s the proxy for union militancy, 
which is measured with two alternative strike frequency variables. Equation (3.2) 
is also estimated in logs even if the corresponding form cannot directly be derived 
from (2.2’).  
14 
  Finally, we could transform equation (2.2) into a wage-share form 
 
(wL/Y) = (1-β)bL/Y + β (2,2’’) 
 
which together with the control variables could be written in the following 
estimating from: 
 
wst = c0 + c1wst-1 + c2bst + c3Et + c4kst + c5st + µt (3.3) 
 
where ws stands for wL/Y, bs for bL/Y and ks for K/Q, Y being nominal output 
and Q real output.
9 
  The problem is that we have no data for the alternative income. The Finnish 
unemployment compensation system is a bit complicated and there is no (single) 
minimum wage. The best we can do is to assume that b is constant but it is related 
to the price level due to some form of indexation. 
  The above-mentioned equations are estimated from an unbalanced panel data 
of Finnish firms (limited liability companies) so that the sample period is 1986–
2002 and the number of firms is 518. Total number of observations is 5089. The 
data do no contain any information on the characteristics of individual employees 
in the way of Abowd et al (1999) for instance. Thus we are not able to make a fair 
comparison between firm specific effects and employee specific effects. The 
estimating equations also include annual dummies to take into account common 
aggregate time-specific effects. They may, of course, also capture changes in the 
alternative income b which are not captured by the price level. Definition of 
variables is explained in Appendix 2. 
  The equations are estimated in various alternative forms: in nominal and real 
form, in level and log level form, and, finally, in the log difference form. In the 
panel data, we do not have firm-specific data for E and S so we have been obliged 
to use (two-digest number) industry level data for these variables
10. More 
precisely, E is the industry average of educational attainment (measured in school 
years) while S is proxied by two alternative variables: the number of persons 
participating in strikes (in relation to employment) and the number of working 
days lost in strikes (again, in relation to employment.). We denote these proxies as 
SN and SD. As for the output variable, we have the turnover data for all firms but 
the value added data only for a part of companies. To overcome this problem we 
have constructed a value-added measure by subtracting the purchase of 
intermediate goods and raw materials from total sales. The results with this 
constructed measure come quite close to the results with the original variable in 
the case both series are available. Notice that the wage rate is here simply the 
                                                 
9 In the case of (2.2’), (2.2’’) would include a capital income-share term +βθ(c⋅K/Y). 
10 This obviously invalidates the conventional t-test statistics as pointed out by Moulton (1990)  
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gross wage sum divided by the number of employees. Quite obviously, there are 
measurement errors in the constructed time series. The problem is that the output 
variable, the value-added, comes quite close to the wage sum and in the cross-
section context w and Q/L are highly correlated, partly due to these measurement 
errors. As a consequence, the coefficients of the other variables may be biased 
downwards. To overcome this problem we use alternative functional 
specifications and alternative proxies for output.
11  
  Before estimating equations (3.1)–(3.3) we shortly consider the empirical 
performance of the skill-complementarity hypothesis from the point of view of 
our data. For that purpose, we introduced a simple test by regressing log(k) on 
log(E) and a set a of dummies for years 1986–2002. The coefficient of log(E) 
turned out to be -0.64 with the t-ratio being 3.4 and R
2 0.018. This suggests that 
the relationship between capital intensity and educational attainment is quite weak 
indeed (and even negative) and may not provide undisputable explanation to wage 
differences between Finnish firms. 
  Now, turn to presentation of the estimation results. The estimates are reported 
in Tables 1–3 below. All estimates are OLS estimates. No fixed cross-section 
effects are introduced because we also want to make use of the cross-section 
variability of wages. 
  The estimates in Table 1 with the non-linear model (3.1) clearly show that 
higher capital intensity (higher K/L ratio) increases the weight of average returns 
in wage determination. Thus, if capital intensity becomes very large, all income 
goes to labour. 
  Basically the same story applies to estimates of the linear approximations 
(3.2) and (3.3) which do now, however, allow for identification of the interaction 
between capital intensity and wage productivity relationship. We may, however, 
add a multiplicative term of s*k to control the joint effect of capital intensity and 
union militancy. We also included dividend and indebtedness variables in 
estimating equation capture the effects of profit sharing and vulnerability of the 
firm’s financial situation in the bargaining situation. These variables turned out to 
be of marginal importance only and therefore the corresponding specification/ 
estimates are not reported. We also introduced the company size variable into the 
analysis but also its role turned out to be marginal which may be explained by the 
fact that the sample just includes big companies (big in Finnish standards). 
  When the equation was estimated in the log form, some signs of nonlinearities 
could be detected. Hence, (3.2) was estimated using a Threshold model 
specification where the coefficient of the capital/labour ratio was allowed to 
change according to the value of k. In other words, we introduced an additional 
                                                 
11 Obviously, the IV (or GMM) estimator would be more appropriate here. Some of the equations 
were indeed estimated by the IV estimator but because the estimates did not really make much 
difference only the OLS estimates are reported here.  
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log(k | k > kc) variable into the estimating equation (see equations (6)–(8) in 
Table  2). A grid search suggested that error variance minimizing value of the 
threshold parameter kc is 1.8 which in fact is quite close to the sample average of 
k. 
 
Table 1.   Panel data estimates for equation (3.1) 
 






























Number inside parentheses are t-ratios. ae and as denote the estimated coefficients 
of EL and s, respectively. Value-added is used for output in all equations. 
 
 
Table 2.   Panel data estimates for equation (3.2) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
w-1  .735 .737 .682 .729 .672 .673 .792 .717 .788 .705 
  (9.15) (9.13) (7.66) (9.20) (7.81) (7.83)  (38.37)  (21.29)  (37.08)  (27.05) 
Q/L  .025 .026 .019 .028 .020 .020 .023 .012 .022 .012 
  (1.43) (1.43) (3.02) (1.50) (3.29) (3.30) (6.70) (7.00) (6.80) (8.78) 
E  .622 .579 .659 .526 .623 .588 .083 .088 .083 .081 
  (3.16) (3.11) (3.27) (3.32) (3.15) (3.40) (5.19) (4.98) (5.02) (4.98) 
k  .245 .264 .152 .282 .177 .170 .016 .025 .022 .006 
  (2.21) (2.86) (1.16) (3.28) (1.72) (3.52) (4.94) (0.51) (5.59) (1.21) 
s  .050 .056 .039 .052 .043 .041 .006 .013 .003 .002 
  (2.11) (2.35) (1.52) (3.24) (3.15) (3.52) (6.04) (1.28) (5.57) (1.76) 
s*k  .015  .365  ..018  .025  .027  .112     
  (0.83) (0.29) (8.76) (3.33) (3.57) (2.21)         
k>1.80          .868  1.026 
           ( 3 . 1 2 )   ( 3 . 5 4 )  
R
2  .787 .787 .794 .710 .720 .719 .790 .810 .791 .813 
SEE .025  .025  .0024  .00022  .00022  .00022 .130 .127 .129 .122 
DW  1.53 1.53 1.45 1.54 1.46 1.46 2.04 2.27 2.03 1.86 
S  SN SD SN SN SN SD SN SN SN SN 
output  T  T VA  T VA VA  T VA  T VA 
Data  Nom Nom Nom Real Real Real Real Real Real Real 
Form  Level Level Level Level Level Level  Log  log  Log  Log 
Numbers inside parentheses are Newey-West t-ratios Row S indicates the measurement of s and 
row output the measurement of output. The T indicates turnover and VA the (constructed) value-
added.  
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Table 3.   Panel data estimates for equation (3.3) 
 




















































2  0.964 0.438 0.678 0.836 0.771 0.548 
SEE  0.024 0.022 0.144 0.127 0.065 0.054 
DW  2.07 2.07  0.875 1.89 1.64 2.22 
Form 













Numbers inside parentheses are New-West t-ratios. T denotes turnover, VA the original 
value-added and VAc the constructed value. 
 
 
As pointed out earlier, the linear model was also estimated in the first difference 
form. In that case, the capital intensity variable turned out to be highly significant 






Finally we may refer to Table 3 which contains the estimates of the wage share 
specification. In this case, persistence varies a lot over different output measures 
but otherwise the estimates follow the same pattern as in the case of equation 
(3.2). Thus capital intensity has a positive impact on the wage share. In other 
words, in capital intensive companies, not only are wages higher but also the 
wage share is, ceteris paribus, higher. 
  The results can be summarized quite easily: Wages are persistent but not 
overly so. Wages are related to average (company) returns which is in accordance 
with the (efficient) bargaining model, or in general with rent sharing models. The 
                                                 
12 The model only includes ∆w,  ∆w-1,  ∆k,  ∆Q/L and time dummies. Thus, the other control 
variables are not included, partly because they are constant over the sample period. Using the first 
difference form obviously eliminates the (cross-section) fixed effects.  
  ∆k   ∆Q/L Output  variable 
  .010 (5.09)  .279 (6.92)  turnover 
  .166 (7.78)  .205 (7.31)  constructed value-added 
  .134 (6.90)  .226 (7.71)  original value-added 
Newey-West t-ratios are inside parentheses  
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labour quality (educational attainment) variable appears to systematically 
significant and correctly sized and signed indicating that some rent is indeed paid 
to human capital. Recalling that E is measured in terms of school years we may 
conclude that doubling the number of school years will increase wages about 40 
per cent. 
  Finally, turn to the capital output ratio and union militancy variables. It 
appears that the variables reflecting striking frequency, are also systematically 
positive and significant suggesting that union militancy pays off in general.
13 
Given the fact that also the capital/labour ratio is significant and correctly sized 
we may conclude that the bargaining story after all has some relevance in 
explaining the wage structure – at least in the Finnish industry. Capital intensive 
industries have to pay a wage premium; the more militant the unions are, the 
bigger is the premium. 
  All that has some powerful implications. If indeed there is positive 
relationship between wages and the capital/labour ratio that may seriously hinder 
investment activity because (cumulated) investment increases the bargaining 
power of unions and the total wage bill.
14 But obviously this is not the full story 
because in a dynamic (general equilibrium) set-up we have to take into account at 
least the income (distribution) effects which may even reverse the basic results 
(see Devereux and Lockwood 1991) not to speak about other complications in 




                                                 
13 The result may compared with other empirical studies which have tried to isolate the union 
effect on (relative) wages. All in all, the results have been quite mixed (see eg Miller and Mulvey 
1996). Obviously the frequency of strikes does not only reflect union militancy but also behaviour 
of firms and overall tension in the labour market. 
14 Take a simple specification of w so that that w = w(K/L). Then, in assuming the CD production 
function with constant returns to scale produces in the cost minimization case the following 
‘solution’ for the capital/labour ratio: k = (1/α)*(w(1 – ε)/(c + w’)) where ε is the elasticity of w 
w.r.t. k. Although either ε or w’ may depend on k we conclude from this condition that the 
bargaining effect leads to lower capital/labour ratio and consequently to slower output growth. See 
Grout (1984) for more thorough analysis. 
15 See Malcomson (1997) for implications of capital accumulation on wage contracts in a dynamic 
set-up.  
19 
4 Concluding  remarks 
Our analysis has shown that there is a positive association between wages and 
capital intensity at the firm level. This relationship stays even if we control labour 
productivity, educational attainment and union militancy. Perhaps the most 
obvious explanation this result is the bargaining power of labour: the power 
increases along with the level capital intensity. This just reflects the vulnerability 
of capital intensive firms to all kinds of labour disputes. If this conjecture is true it 
has powerful implications to investment and growth and therefore it deserves 
further analysis with data from other sort labour market institutions’ countries. It 
would also be interesting to study to which extent this arguments apply to 
nontangible capital, or even human capital. 
  The fact that firm characteristics seem to be crucial in explaining the wage 
structure suggests that the labour market is not functioning very efficiently. True, 
we have been able to control the characteristics of employees (and work quality) 
only marginally but even then the relationship between wages and capital 
intensity appears to be so strong that it is no point of characterizing the labour 
market as perfectly competitive. Irrespectively of the exact reasons behind this 
relationship, it is clear that it leads to lower output (growth) and welfare. Also 




Comparative statistics with the efficiency wage specification 
Take equation (2.5) 
 
pAu(w)f(k) – w – ck  (2.5) 
 
Derive the first order conditions and totally differentiate the conditions with 
respect to k, w and, for instance, p. Then you end up with the following conditions 
 
pAuf”dk + pu’f’dw = -Auf’dp 
 
pAu’f’dk + pAu”fdw = -Au’fdp 
 
Using Cramer’s rule you can derive the comparative statics results with respect to 
dk/dp and dw/dp which are 
 








Using the CD production function and specification for u(w) in text, we derive 
simple expressions for these values, that is 
 
dk/dp = (1 – u)/(α + u – 1) > 0 
 
dw/dp = 1/(α + u – 1) > 0 
 
Obviously these expressions can get perverse values if both α and u are very small 





w  the wage rate (the wage sum divided by employment) 
L  employment measured by the number of employees 
Q  output which is measured by total turnover, value-added or alternatively 
by a constructed value-added variable (which is turnover – purchases of 
intermediate costs and raw materials) 
E average  educational  attainment of the labour force in industry i measured 
in average school-years 
SD  number of strike days lost in industry i in relation to employment  
SN    number of persons participating in strikes in industry in relation to 
employment  
K  capital stock in current prices 
P  the consumer price index 
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